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class of lawyers, embracing especially those who have some pretensions to scholarship, to affect a peculiar reverence for the civil law,
and those special systems which have sprung from, or are founded
upon it; and those who have made the maritime law and admiralty
practice a specialty, naturally become enamored of the system to
which they have devoted their studies; and not unfrequently
manifest irritability and impatience if its authority is questioned
or if it is more restricted in its application in this than -in some
-other commercial countries.
We confess a sympathy with this feeling to a certain extent.
We like the maritime law and are fond of studying its authorities.
We think it embodies juridical principles most just and rational ;
and are glad to see it observed and applied in all cases where it
can be without violating long-established rules of property and the
received law of the land. But these we feel bound to observe at
all hazards, until they are amended by valid legislation, or modified
by the silent operation of changed circumstances and conditions.
Whilst always fully alive to the progressive principle founded on
the maxims, cessante ratione cessat et ipsa lex, and ratio est vita
juris, we deprecate that wild love of theory which would cut loose
from all respect for precedent and authority, and introduce entire
new systems of jurisprudence unknown to our predecessors and to
ourselves except as subjects of curious reading and research for
the purpose of aiding our knowledge of comparative jurisprudence.
Let maritime law be profoundly studied; let its benign principles be faithfully applied to all the cases which our own laws permit
and allow to be done; and if it is desirable to apply them still
farther, and to modify and amend our own jurisprudence, let it be
done in an orderly manner and by that department of the government to which it appertains to make and amend the laws.
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A strip of sandy beach, mainly valuable for its sand as an article of merchandise, was owned in fee by the plaintiffs, and the defendant claimed a prescriptive

-right to take sand ad libitum therefrom. Held, that evidence that the defendant,
as one of the public, and not as incident to an estate in other lands, had taken
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sand ad libitun from the beach, did not tend to prove an individual prescriptive
right.
Such an unlimited right to take the sand would be equivalent to full ownership
and inconsistent with the plaintiffs' title in fee.
A prescription, as well as a custom, to he valid must not be unreasonable.
The right would be a profit & prendre and not an easement, and such rights must
as a general and perhaps universal rule be prescribed for as incident to other lands,
for the benefit of or in connection with which the rights are to be exercised.
The word "1beach" has no such inflexible meaning that it must denote land
between high and low water mark.
It is not necessary that the court should order the parties called before taking
the verdict of the jury.
TRESPASS quare clausumfregit. The locus in quo was a sandbeach adjoining the waters of Long Island Sound, and the trespass charged was the taking of sand therefrom. The defence was
that the beach was a public one and that the public had from time
immemorial taken sand from it, and that the defendant had the
right in common with the public.
After the charge the jury retired from the court-room for consultation, and held the case under consideration during the remainder of the day and the day following, until 12J o'clock P. m.,
when they came into court, and by their foreman announced that
they had not agreed upon a verdict. The court directed them to
keep the case under consideration longer, and then adjourned to
2 o'clock P. M. At that hour the jury came into court and returned a verdict for the defendant.
Only one of the plaintiffs attended the trial and proceedings at
any time, and that one left the court-house and went to his home
at the time of the adjournment at 12J o'clock P. m. Neither of
the plaintiffs was present when the jury came into court in the
afternoon and rendered their verdict, and the plaintiff who attended the trial did not come into court till after the jury had
rendered their verdict and been discharged from the case and
were leaving the court-room. The plaintiffs had but two attorneys
in the cause, and one of them was necessarily absent from the
court during the day, engaged in the trial of a case in another
court, held about twenty rods from the court-house, and was not
present that day. The other was in attendance at court at 12J
o'clock P. it., when he received a despatch summoning him from
court. But lie sent by a messenger a notice to the other counsel
that he must leave. The messenger did not deliver this notice
till after the verdict was rendered and the court adjourned. The
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plaintiffs' other counsel would have attended at once if lie had
received the notice or had knowledge of the absence of his associate. The court had no notice of the absence of the plaintiffs'
counsel, of of the absence of the plaintiffs, when the verdict was
rendered.
Sturges and Child, for plaintiffs.-1. It was the duty of the court
to have had the plaintiffs called before the verdict was taken, and
judgment should have been arrested because this. was not done:
3 Black. Com. 376; 1 Swift Dig. 773. And contrary also
to precedent: The People v. The 111ayor's Court of Albany, 1
Wend. 36; Duncomb's Trials per Pais 257; State v. Hurlbut, 1
Root 90.
2. To gain a right adverse to the plaintiffs the defendant must
have gained a title by prescription. This right is an individual
right, and cannot be proved by a use on the part of the public.
Nor would public use give the defendant any claim thereto:
Wasbb. on Easements 80; Perley v. Langley, 7 N. llamp. 233;
Selby v. Robinson, 2 T. R. 758; Washb. on Easements 77, 78,
128, 129; Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425, 432; Cortelyou v.
ran Brunt, 2 Johns. 357; Mfanion v. Creigh, 37 Oonn. 462,
464 ; rilliamsv. N. Y. & New Haven B. B. Co., 39 Conn. 509 ;
State v. JWilson, 42 Maine 9, 28; Bethurn v. Turner, 1 Greenl.
i11.
Beardsley, with whom was Seeley, contret.
SEYMOUR, C. J.-The land in dispute is a sand-beach, about
one hundred and eighty rods in length, four rods wide, and of an
average height of four and a half feet above high water. It is
connected with the upland on the east by what is called "Beach
Lane, " and is bounded southerly by Long Island Sound proper,
and on the west and north by a cove of salt-water fiats, over which
the tide rises and falls, but which seems to be private property.
The defendant is sued for entering upon this sand-beach and
carting away large quantities of sand, and that he did the acts for
which he is sued is admitted. The jury, under the instruction of
the court, found that the plaintiffs owned the premises in dispute
in fee, and the verdict, which was for the defendant, must have
been rendered for him on one of two grounds ; either, first, that
the public had by long-continued user acquired the :'ight to take
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sand from the promises ad libitum, or, second, that the defendant
as an individual had by prescription acquired such right.
It seems clear to us that the verdict cannot be sustained on the
ground of an incorporeal right in the unorganized public to take
the sand. Indeed the evidence offered by the defendant does not
seem to be directed to the establishment of such a right, as distinct
from the title to the land itself. The motion says "the defendant
offered a large number of witnesses to prove that said beach was
and immemorially had been a public beach; that from time immemorial the public had resorted to it, andipassed and driven over it,
and taken therefrom continually large quantities of sea-weed, sand
and gravel, for use and merchandise, &c."
This evidence was
undoubtedly admissible as tending to show that the title and possession of the premises was not in the plaintiffs. It might tend to
show that the sand-bank had never been included in any grant
from the state, but was left a public beach, open to the common
use of the public, like the sea itself and its shores. But the jury
found that the plaintiffs owned the land, and the question is
whether this public use proved, or tended to prove, an easement
in the public to take sand from the plaintiffs' land, or tended to
prove such right as a profit 4 prendre. Now even if the unorganized public is capable of taking such a right by grant or acquiring
it by prescription, which it would seem they are not, we think the
evidence is not adapted to the establishment of a subordinate right
or easement in the premises. This subject is fully and learnedly
discussed in Post v. Pearsall,20 Wendell 111, and 22 Wendell
425, where all the cases bearing on the question are cited.
The verdict then, if sustainable at all, must be justified on the
ground that the defendant had an individual prescriptive right to
take and carry away the sand from the plaintiffs' land. The
evidence to prove such prescriptive right was " that the defendant
for the period of twenty years had continuously and uninterruptedly taken sand and gravel from the portion of the beach in dispute
for use and for sale; " that is, the defendant, to prove a prescriptive right in himself, offered evidence showing that he had done
precisely what the public had done; that he, in other words, as
one of the public, had taken sand from the beach ad libitum. lHe
did this, not as the owner of other lands, for the benefit of those
lands and as incident to an estate in such other lands, but in gross,
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as one of the public, and not under any claim of individual right
in himself other than as one of the public.
We think this evidence did not show an individual prescriptive
right in the defendant ; and, so far as it was received as tending to
show such right, was inadmissible.
It is further to be observed that the property in dispute appears
to be valuable mainly and perhaps solely for its sand as an article
of merchandise. An unlimited right in the defendant to take and
sell all the sand is therefore equivalent to full ownership, and is
inconsistent with the title in fee of the plaintiffs. The claim of
such a right in another's land by custom or by prescription is
unnatural and unreasonable, and is not sanctioned bw the law. If
allowed, the whole beach would be at the defendant's mercy. A
prescription, as well as a custom, to be valid must not be unreasonable: Clayton v. Corby, 5 Adol. & El. N. S. 415, 422.
Again, this right is prescribed for in gross, and not as appurtenant to other lands. The right, if it exists, is a profit 8 prendre
and not a mere easement, and such rights must generally and
perhaps universally be prescribed for not in gross, but as incident
to other premises for the benefit of which and in connection with
which the rights are to be exercised: arimstear v. 1Marlone, 4 T.
R. 717.
We therefore advise a new trial.
The defendant, under the statute authorizing him so to do, has
filed his bill of exceptions, claiming that the judge's charge at the
trial was wrong in regard to the construction of the plaintiffs'
deeds, and upon examination of the deeds in connection with the
maps of the premises we think the judge was wrong in saying to
the jury "that the sand-beach was by operation of law embraced
in the conveyance, and that the title acquired thereby extended to
ordinary high water-mark."
The high-water mark referred to in the charge is that mark on
the south side of the sand-beach. The deeds bound the land conveyed "southerly on the beach," but it seems there are two
southerly boundaries which may answer this description; one is
the sand-beach, the other is the Long Island Sound beach, namely,
the space between high and low water mark on the south side of
the sand-beach. There may perhaps be also another beach,
namely, the space between high and low water mark on the north
side of the sand-beach. The maps seem to indicate such a beach,
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but the record does not distinctly show that it exists. We think
it was competent to show by the other parts of the deeds and by
the situation and use of the property, and also by proper parol evidence, which of the beaches was intended.
We see no reason for holding that in law the beach means the
shore of Long Island Sound, especially as the deeds do not bound
the premises by the sound. The word "beach" has no such inflexible meaning that it must denote land between high and low
water mark. The premises in dispute are called either sandbeach, or beach simply without the prefix. The plaintiffs in thcir
writ bound their premises southerly by "Long Island Sound,"
which would seem to be the natural mode of describing them in the
deeds, if it had been intended that they should extend to ordinary
high-water mark on the sound.
Some other questions were made on the trial which it is unnecessary to notice. One question of practice however was considerably discussed at the bar, concerning which it is proper, we
think, for us to express our opinion. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that the court ought to have made a formal call of the parties
before taking the verdict of the jury. A practice formerly existed
of making such call, but it has for many years been discontinuel.
The plaintiff may at any time become nonsuit before the verdict
is taken, but if he neglects to avail himself of that privilege he
must suffer the consequences. It is not the duty of the court to
call the parties. They are bound to be present, and after appearance are presumed to continue their appearance until they ask to
be called and to disappear.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
I. The question discussed to some extent in the foregoing case, how far it is
indispensable to call the parties, in a
civil cause, before accepting the verdict
of the jury, is one of considerable practical importance. If that formality is
regarded as indispensable it will necessitate the constant attendance of counsel, until the verdict is rendered in court,
or the jury dismissed for failure to agree.
We are inclined to believe that such
was the English practice, and probably
enough is, at the present day. For we
are quite confident it obtained in this

country fifty years ago, with far more
uniformpity than at the present time.
The English Abridgments do nct always
refer to this point, it being one of no
great difficulty, where the routine (f
practice is so strictly adhered to as in
England: PetersdorffAb. tit. Jury. But
we find one reported case, and there
'may very likely be others, in the English reports, where it is expressly declared that, where the jury retire to
consider their verdict, the attorneys of
the parties ought to remain in court to
hear it delivered: Dauntley v. Hyde, 6
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Jur. 133, in Exch. And we distinctly
recall delays having occurred, fifty years
ago or less, in waiting for the arrival
of the counsel on both sides, before accepting the verdict of a jury. And it
seems to us this is the most regular and
least obJiectionable course. For in every
case where a jury returns into court
agreed, in the absence of one or both
the counsel of the parties, if the verdict
is immediately accepted, it may turn
out that, by reason of some defect in
the form of the verdict, or in the special
findings, the judge may desire to send
the jury to a further consideration of
the case, and to give them further special instructions upon those points. In
all such cases the counsel for both parties must regularly be present. For we
have never known any court give further instructions to the jury, in the absence of the counsel upon either side,
however much it might be their fault,
although it is said the practice in some
quarters will justify even this. The
court would naturally, one would think,
sooner punish the counsel for contempt,
in not giving proper attendance upon
their business in court, and thus delaying the progress of the business of the
court, than allow any such irregularity
as the further charging of the jury, in
the absence of the counsel upon either
side or upon both.
But we know that in more than one
state besides Connecticut, it is not uncommon to receive the verdict of the
jurywithout calling the parties, or knowing that their counsel are always present, upon the same ground taken in
the principal case, that it is the duty
of the counsel to be present, and the
court may. assume it will be performed.
But we had always supposed that the
practice was not strictly regular, but
knowing of course, that if the party
against whom the verdict was given in
the absence of his counsel, suffered no
detriment, he could prefer no available
claim to have the verdict set aside, upon

the mere ground of an informality in it
being delivered in court in the absence
of his counsel, through his own fault.
We are inclined to believe this is the
only ground upon which the omission
of any well established formality in jury
trials can be justified, viz., that they
are mere forms, and in no just sense
conduce to secnring the important ends
of justice.
The practice of the courts, it should
be remembered, upon this and upon all
other subjects, mvst of necessity conform to the habits of counsel. In the
large cities, where numerous courts are
in session at the same time, the counsel
are often called away, as soon as the
cause is submitted to the jury, by other
imperious demands upon their services.
And if that is not the fact, it becomes
practically impossible to keep the counsel in attendance upon the court a moment longer than they are occupied in
the trial of the particular cause. For
the court, then, to be at the trouble to
hunt them up every time the jury return
into court, would entail an intolerable
burden upon the court and its officers,
and place the public administration of
justice more at the mercy of the bar than
would be altogether consistent with its
proper influence upon the public respect.
It may be said the courts should enforce the necessary rules of practice
upon that subject, and not attempt an
indirect compensation, by acting, in the
absence of counsel, upon the presumption of their presence, when that is
known to be the exception oftener than
the rule. But in practice the latter will
be found to be the only available remedy, since it is not easy, we might say
not possible, to enforce any rules of
practice whose necessity is not apparent.
And as this rule of requiring the attendance of counsel, after the case is
submitted to the jury, until the verdict
is rendered in court, would not be of the
least importance in one case in ten, and
might sometimes require the attendance
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of counsel, day after day, to no purpose, and at the serious inconvenience
of counsel, it seems every way better to
allow counsel to absent themselves after
the case is committed to the jury, but
upon their own peril, with the implied
reservation, that the court will not allow such absence of counsel to work serious detriment to the client, or produce
a miscarriage of justice. We have occupied so much space upon this first
point, that we must be brief upon what
was regarded at the trial as the important question in the case.
1I. How far tile facts tended to lay
the foundation of a presumptive or prescriptive right to take sand from the
beach in the manner the defendant did ?
The minute distinctions in the phraseology applied to rights claimed by prescription, are not of much practical significance at the present (lay. Whether
we call the defendant's claim a custom or
a prescription is not important. The
main inquiry will always be, how far
the use by defendant possessed the qualities upon which prescriptions or customs are founded, or .may lawfully be
maintained ?
1. The use must certainly be of a character to indicate a claim of right. For
if not so, it will not affect the owrier of
the estate, out of which the prescriptive
right is claimed, with knowledge or notice that the claim is of an adverse character, as against all counter claims of
right. This was evidently not made to
appear very distinctly in the principal
case. The fact that everybody who
chose went to the beach for sand and
gravel, at all times, without rebuke,
tended quite as much to show consent,
or permission, on the part of the owners
of the land, is it did any acknowledgment of the right in such persons to go
and take sand and gravel at will ; perhaps more so. If the defendant had
done this for the use of some particular
piece of land in his occupancy, or if he
had been the only one who did it, it

would have had far more the appearance
of being done under a claim of right.
So too if there had been an annual accumulation of sand, by force of the
tides, which the defendant had annually
removed, there would have been something more definite and distinct in the
act, as a claim of right. It might have
more the appearance of a profit a prendre, as it is called in the books.
But nothing almost could have been
more indeterminate than the loose general way in which the defendant, in
common with all others, went to take
sand and gravel from the beach; not
when he required it for some definite
need or use, but at all times, either for
use or sale, just when the mood took
him. The transaction certainly had
very much the appearance of being done
because the owners did not choose to
interfere, which is another form of expressing permission or license, or else
because the defendant claimed to be the
owner of the beach, which does not
seem to have been urged. The transaction did not violate the civil law
maxim applicable to the subject, nec vi,
nec dan, nec precario,except in the latter particular, that it seemed to be done
by consent of the owner ; but that defeated its operation as a basis of prescription. It must meet every particular of the maxim in order to form the
basis of prescription. The maxim seems
to be restricted in its application, to
rights which are of this incorporeal
character. For the Statute of Limitations will bar the right of entry upon
lands, notwithstanding the occupant
may have originally entered by force,
or even by permission of the owner, if
the holding afterwards becomes adverse.
The foregoing views are maintained in
a large number of cases, too numerous
to be here specifically referred to : Angell on Watercourses, 219, etseq., and
cases cited in notes.
2. It is equally essential to the creation of a prescriptive right, that the
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party, against whom it is claimed,
should be shown to have acquiesced in
the counter claim, for the requisite term,
the statutory limitation upon rights of
entry upon land. This acquiescence implies, that the party against whom the
right is claimed should, during thepitire period, have been aware of the
existence and exercise of such counterclaim. This may be shown by distinct
notice to that effect, hut where no such
notice is attempted to be shown, as was
the fact in the principal case, the point
of acquiescence must be shown entirely
by the nature of the acts done, and the
manner in which they were done, as
indicating a distinct and definite claim
of right to do the acts, and to continue
to do them, or else a merely precarious
or permissive indulgence. So that in
the present case, and in most cases of
this character, the acquiescence, being
matter of inference mainly, must depend entirely upon the acts done and
the natural inference from, and construction of, such acts. And where the
claim and the acquiescence both depend
entirely upon the nature of the acts done
in the assertion of the claim, it would
seem but reasonable that such acts
should possess the character of clear
and unequivocal acts of right and ownership. Rights of such importance to
both parties, as are often attempted to
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he maintaincd by mere uic on the one
side, and acquiescence on the other,

should never be left to mere conjecture.
It may be true, as said in Perrin v.
Garfield, 37 Vt. 31U, that, in general,
the enjoyment of an easement is to be
referred to a claim of right, hut it is
here said also, that where the act is entirely consistent with a mere temporary
indulgence on the part of the owner, it
may he treated as an exception to the
general rule. We should be inclined,
as before intimated, to state the general rule somewhat more sirongly against
the claimant than it is given above.
The act should be of a character to
rouse the apprehension of the owner at
once, that it is done under a claim of
right, or else his silence will not be
regarded as an acquiescence in any
claim which can ever ripen into right.
The cases all agree that the user must
be, in fact, adverse in order to raise
the presumption of a grant: Trask v.
Ford, 39 Me. 437. And in order that
the claim be adverse, it must he known,
as such, to the party against whom it is
made. In other words there must not
only be an adverse claim, but it must
be acquiesced in, as such: Hoy v. Sterredt, 2 Watts 331 ; BIGELOW, C. J., in
Brace v. Yale, 10 Allen 444.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of fafmyland.
SUSAN WECKLER v. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF
HAGERSTOWN.
Banks, like other private corporations, are confined to the sphere of action
limited by the terms and intent of the charter.
In inquiring into the power of a corporation to make contracts, it must be considered, lst, whether its charter, or the statute law binding upon it, permits or forbids it to make such contract; or, 2d, may such power be implied as incidental to
its existence ; or, 3d, is the contract foreign to the purposes of its creation.
By sect. 8 of The National Bank Act, authorizing the incorporation of national
banking associations, the kind of banking is limited and defined ; and, as the act
VoL. XXIII.-77
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contains no grant of the power to engage in bond brokerage, it is, therefore, prohibited to them. Nor is it necessary to the purpose of their existence, or in any
sense incidental to the business of banking.
In an action of deceit against a national bank, seeking to recover damages for
the alleged fraudulent representations of its teller made in the sale to the plaintiff
of certain railroad bonds, Held, That the business of selling bonds on commission
is not within the scope of the powers of national banking associations, and
the bank cannot, under any circumstances, carry it on; and being thus beyond its
corporate power, the defence of ultra vires is open to it, and the bank is not responsible for any false representations, by which the plaintiff may have been damnified, made by its teller, in any such dealing.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Washington county.

This was an action of deceit against the appellee, the defendant
below, a banking association, organized under the Act of Congress,
approved June 3d 1864 (13 Stat. at Large 99, Rev. St. U. S., tit.
62, sects. 5133-5243), now cited as "The National Bank Act."
As such association it was sought to be charged because of
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by its teller, made in the
sale of bonds of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.
The allegations of the narr.were that at the time of the making
of the representations by the defendant (the appellee), it, as a
banking association, made known that a part of its business, as
such association, was the purchase and sale upon commission of
the bonds of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company; that it
caused the appellant, the plaintiff below, to be solicited and
induced to purchase two of said bonds, each of the denomination
of five hundred dollars, as a safe and profitable investment ; that
in the making of such solicitation, the teller of the appellee, as its
agent, fraudulently, knowingly and falsely represented to the
appellant that one J. F. S. had purchased ten thousand dollars'
worth of these bonds; that they were better than certain other
named bonds, and as good as government bonds ; that the interest,
when due, would be paid at appellee's counter; that whenever she
wished to dispose of them, the defendant would sell the same for
her at what they would cost her; that relying solely upon these
representations, and moved by no other considerations, she purchased the said bonds, whereby she lost the use of her money, and
the defendant, the appellee, became liable to her for the same, with
interest, damages, &c.
The dcmurrer interposed having been overruled, the defendant
pleaded the general issue, _Not guilty.
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At the trial, the prayers offered by both plaintiff and defendant
were refused, and the jury was instructed :"That the National Bank Act, under which the defendant is
organized as a banking association, limits the action of the bank
to the pursuit of the objects specified in the Act of Congress, and
that the purchase and sale of such bonds is not within tle chartered powers of the defendant," and although the jury should find
the facts set forth in the narr., "still the plaintiff could not
recover in this action against the defendant by 'eason of such
representation."
The verdict being for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.
H. H. Keedy, for appellant.
Albert Small and George Schley, for appellee.-But two questions are involved in this issue, both of which were raised upon the
demurrer.
First, Does an action of deceit lie against a corporation ; and
Second, Conceding the facts alleged, and that the action will
lie, is the appellee liable, the acts complained of being clearly
ultra vires.
1. An incorporated company cannot, in its corporate character,
be called on to answer in an action for deceit: 71restern Bank of
Scotland v. Addie, Law Rep. 1 H. L. Sc. 145. The only late
case in conflict: Swift v. Winterbothani P. 0., Law Rep. 8 Q. B.
244, is expressly overruled on appeal to the Exch. Ch. in the same
case sub nom. : Swift v. Jewsburg P. 0., Law Rep. 9 Q. B. 301.
2. The acts complained of are ultra vires, and the appellee cannot be bound by any act or representation of its officer in this
behalf: Tome v. ParkersburgBranch .RailroadCompany, 39 Md.
36; Penna., Del. & Md. Steam lavigation Gompany v. Dandridge,
8 Gill & Johns. 248; Duncan v. Maryland Savings Institution,
10 Gill & Johns. 299 ; U. S. v. City Bank of Columbus, 21 How.
356; Merchants' Bank v. Mlarine Bank, 3 Gill 125; .Minor v.
Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46; per 'MARSHALL, 0.
J. : Hiad v. Providence Insurance Co., 2 Cranch 127, 169; 4
Wheat. 518; 12 Id. 64.
Banking, apart from the very elaborate definition given in the
Act of Congress, is defined in Duncan v. Maryland Savings Institution, supra, as "consisting of the right of issuing negotiable notes,
discounting notes and receiving deposits ;" citing People v. The
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President,&c., of the M11anhattan Co., 5 Conn. 383; The People
v. The Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 390. And see Angell &
Ames, Corps., sect. 55, n. 3; Grant on Banking 1, 6, 381, 614;
Bank for Savings v. The Collector, 3 Wall. 495. To this general
definition the Act of Congress adds, "buying and selling exchange,
coin and bullion."
The construction of the Act, since banking is not in itself a corporate franchise, but a limitation upon and in derogation of common-law rights, must be strict and exclusive: Curtis v. Leavitt,
15 N. Y. 52; Bullard v. Bank, 18 WVall. 589. This section is a
rescript of sect. 18 of the General Banking Law of New York,
passed in 1838, and as to these provisions is in totidem verbis.
The New York Act has passed under careful scrutiny, and has
met with frequent judicial interpretation. The question in this
issue, the power of a bank to traffic in stocks, arose under the
New York Act, in Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. (3 Seld.) 327, and
tite court, after conceding that stocks might be legitimately bought
or taken for many purposes incident to the express power to conduct the business of banking, at p. 343, says: "The proposition,
however, to be established, is the right to traffic in them, or to
acquire them for the special objects contemplated by the arrangement of the parties in this case; and these sections neither prove
nor tend to prove any authority of that nature." * * * "I am,
for the reasons suggested, of the opinion that this bank had no
authority to traffic in stocks as 'an article of merchandise.'
The same point was ruled in Bank Commissioners v. St. Lawrence Bank, Id. 513 ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 168, and in
Barnes v. OntarioBank, 19 N. Y. 152. In the construction of
the powers of National Banking Associations, in other matters, as
given in sect. 8 of the Act, similar views are held by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in Biowler v. Sculley, 72 Penna. St. 456;
The FirstNational Bank of Lyon v. The Ocean National Bank,
a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals of New York,
reported 2 Cent. L. J. 267 ; Shinkle v. Tie First National Bank
of Ripley, 22 Ohio 516 ; Shoemaker v. The National Afechanies'
Bank, 2 Abbott U. S. Rep. 416; and Stewart v. The National
Union Bank, Id. 424.
And the principle announced in these cases is fully recognised
by this court in The First National Bank of Charlotte v. The
National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 39 Md. 610. The only
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case in conflict is Leach v. Hale, 31 Iowa 69, and that is so evidently a case of bailment, and nothing more, that not even the
positive assertion of the court can avail against the facts. The
view taken ii this case, too, is fully and satisfactorily controverted
in the analogous case decided at its February Term 1875, by the
Supreme Court of Vermont: lViley v. The First National Bank
of Brattleboro', ante, 342.
-Persons dealing with the agents or officers of a corporation are
held to know the powers of the corporation: The Miners' Ditch
Company v. Zellerbach et al., 1 Withrow's American Corporation
Cases 275 (37 Calif. 543); Pierce v. lJladison,J- Ind. Railroad
Co., 21 How. 443. Nor will a corporation be held liable for the
fraud of its agent committed colore offlii: Mayor
(. (C. v.
C.
.Eshbaeh, 18 Md. 276; Same v. Reynolds, 20 Id. 1; Duckett v.
County Commissioners A. A. Co., Id. 468 ; Horn v. Miayor & C.
C., 30 Id. 218 ; Fosterv. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 599 ; Mrechanics'
Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad Co., 13 N. Y. (3 Kern.) 600.
Is the appellee estopped from making such a defence ? The doctrine of estoppel, as applicable to such a defence by a corporation,
is very clearly put in Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad Co., 22
Conn. 1, 502, thus: "Where a corporation has the power to do an
act, they may be estopped from objecting that the form they
adopted was not the exact mode prescribed by the charter; but
where the question is one of power, they cannot be deemed estopped to deny that they have done what they never could by
legal possibility have done." And this principle is held and enforced in The Penna., Del. 11Md. Steam Navigation Co. v. Dandridge, supra, and in Albert F'
JiVfe, v. The Savings Bank, 2 Md.
159
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-A question of importance and of first impression
in this state arises on this appeal. It is broadly and 'clearly
whether the bank had authority, under the Act of Congress, to
engage in the business of selling bonds of railroad companies on
commission.
A bank, like other private corporations, is confined to the sphere
of action limited by the terms and intention of its charter. The
Supreme Court, in the case of the Bank of The United States v.
Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 68, states the rule by which the powers of
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the bank are to be determined thus : " Whatever may be the implied powers of aggregate corporations by the common law, and
the modes by which those powers are to be carried into operation,
corporations created by statute must depend, both for their powers
and the mode of exercising them, upon the true construction of
the statute itself:" and in that case the court adopts, as entirely
correct and applicable to the bank, the doctrine laid down by
'Chief Justice MARShALL in 2 Cranch 167, in reference to an in-

surance company, viz. : "Without ascribing to this body, which,
in its corporate capacity, is the mere creature of the act to which
it owes its existence, all the qualities and disabilities annexed by
the common law to ancient institutions of this sort,,it may be correctly said to be precisely what the incorporating act has made it,
to derive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of exercising its faculties only in the manner in which that act authorizes."
And in this state the law is well settled that a corporation created
for a specific purpose not only can make no contract forbidden by
its charter, but in general can make no contract which is not
necessary either directly or indirectly to enable it to answer that
purpose. In deciding, therefore, whether a corporation can make
a particular contract, it must be considered, in the first place,
whether its charter or some statute binding upon it forbids or permits it to make such a contract; and if its charter and valid
statutory law are silent upon the subject, in the second place,
whether the power to make such a contract may not be implied
6
upon the part of the corporati n as directly or incidentally necessary to enable it to fulfil the purpose of its existence; or whether
the contract is entirely foreign to that purpose. A corporation has
no other powers than such as are specifically granted or such as
are necessary for the purpose of carrying into effedt the powers
expressly granted : Penna., Del. 4f 31d. Steam Naviqation Company v. Dandridge,8 Gill & Johns. 818, 819.
We must, therefore, determine the true construction of the Act
of Congress authorizing the formation of these banking associations, and whether the power to make contracts like the one in
question is expressly conferred upon them, or is directly or indirectly necessary to enable them to fulfil the purpose of their
creation,,or is entirely foreign to that purpose.
So far as the purpose of the law is indicated by its title, it
is " To provide a national currency, secured by a pledge of
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United States bonds, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof." After prescribing in previous sections the
mode by, and the conditions under which, banking associations
may be formed, the 8th section declares that every association so
formed shall become a body corporate from the date of its certificate of organization, but shall transact no business "except
such as may be incidental to its organization until authorized
by the comptroller of the currency to commence the business of
banking." Power is then given it to adopt a corporate seal, to
have succession by the name designated in its organization certificate, and in that name to make contracts and sue and be sued, to
elect directors and other officers, "and exercise under this act all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking by discounting and negotiating promissory notes,
drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving
deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by
loaning money on personal security, and by obtaining, issuing and
circulating notes according to the provisions of this act."
This is the only portion of the statute to which, for the purposes
of this case, it is necessary to refer. By it the associations are
not simply incorporated as banks, and the scope of their corporate
business left wholly to implication, but the kind of banking which
they may conduct is limited and defined. As we read the language
of this 8th sect. it authorizes the associations to carry on banking
"by discouiting and negotiating promissory notes," &c., and to
exercise "1all such incidental powers" as shall be necessary to
conduct that business. The mode in which the incidental powers
may be exercised is not defined, but all incidental powers which
they can exercise must be necessary or incidental to the business
of banking thus limited and defined. To the usual attributes of
banking, consisting of the right to issue notes for circulation, to
discount commercial paper and to receive deposits, this law adds
the special power to buy and sell exchange, coin and bullion ; but
we look in vain for any grant of power to engage in the business
charged in this declaration. It is not embraced in the power to
" discount and negotiate" promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt. The ordinary meaning of
the term "to discount" is to take interest in advance, and in banking it is a mode of loaning money. It is the advance of money not
due until some future period, less the interest which would be due
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thereon when payable. The power " to negotiate" a bill or note
is the power to endorse and deliver it to another so that the right
of action thereon shall pass to the endorsee or holder. No construction can be given to these terms, as used in this statute, so
broad as to comprehend the authority to sell bonds for third parties
on commission, or to engage in business of that character. The
appropriate place for the grant of such a power -would be in the
clause conferring authority to "buy and sell," but we find that
limited to specific things, among which bonds are not mentioned,
and upon the maxim, JExpressio unius est exclusio alterius, and in
view of the rule of interpretation of corporate powers before stated,
the carrying on of such a business is prohibited to these associations. Nor can we perceive it is in anywise necessary to the purposes of their existence, or in any sense incidental to the business
they are empowered to conduct, that they should become bond
brokers or be allowed to traffic in every species of obligations
issued by the innumerable corporations, private and municipal, of
the country. The more carefully they confine themselves to the
legitimate business of banking, as defined in this law, the more
effectually will they subserve the purposes of their creation. By
a strict adherence to that they will best accommodate the commercial community, as well as protect their shareholders.
Such is our construction of this statute, and it is supported by
the best considered authorities, and the decided preponderance of
judicial opinion in other states.
This eighth section is almost identical in terms (and as respects
the present question completely so) with the Banking Act of New
York of 1838, oh. 260; and the Court of Appeals of that state, in
Talmage v. Pell, 3 Selden 328, held that banking associations,
formed under that law, have authority only to carry on the business of banking in the manner and with the powers specified in
the act, and have no power to purchase state stocks to sell at a
profit or as a means of raising money except when received as
security for a loan or taken in payment of a loan or debt. In
speaking of the transaction under review in that case the court
says, the banking company "purchased these bonds as they might
have purchased a cargo of cotton to send to market, to be sold at
the risk of the vendor for the highest price that could be obtained.
No authority to traffic in either commodity is expressly given by
the law of 1838. It is, therefore, claimed as a power incident to
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the business of bankling. But the 8th sect. of the act declares that
this business shall be carried on by discounting bills, notes and
other evidences of debt, by loaning money on real and personal
security, by buying and selling gold and silver bullion, foreign
coin and bills of exchange, &c. The subjects pertaining to the
business of banking are designated, and the express powers of the
association are limited to them and to such incidental powers as
may be necessary to transact the business thus defined by the
legislature." They then proceed to show that the claim to base
the validity of the contract upon any incidental power is unfounded,
and pronounce the transaction illegal, and the assignment by the
company of the mortgages which they held, as collateral security
for the purchase, void. So also in recent decisions of the courts
of last resort, in several of the states where this Act of Congress,
and especially its 8th sect., has been considered, we find it construed in entire accord with the view we have taken of it. We
refer to Fowler v. Scully, 72 Penna. St. 456 ; Shinkle v. First
Zrational Bank of Ripley, 22 Ohio 516 ; IWiley v. First National Bank of Brattleboro', decided by the Supreme Court of
Vermont at its February term 1875, (ante, p. 342), and First
National Bank of Lyon v. Ocean National Bank, decided by the
Court of Appeals of New York. In the last-mentioned case there
is a very able opinion of the court by ALLEN, J., in which he says
he fully concurs in the views expressed by Judge WHEELER in
the Vermont case, and in reference to the case of J'an Leuven v.
First National Bank of Kingston, shortly reported (the opinion
of the judges not being given) in 54 New York 671, which has
been pressed upon our attention by the appellant's counsel, he
says it decided no general principle, but by a divided court it was
determined that the contract in that case, under the circumstances,
was the contract of the corporation and not the individual contract of the president.
We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that this business of selling
bonds on commission is not within the scope of the powers of the
corporations, and the bank could not, under any circumstances,
carry it -on: and being thus beyond its corporate powers, the
defence of ultra vires is open to the appellee : 8 G. & J. 348. It
follows from this that the bank is not responsible for any false
representations made by its teller to the appellant by which she
was induced tc purchase the bonds in question. Hence there was
VOL. XXIII.-78
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no error in the court's instruction to the jury nor in the rejection
of the appellant's first and second prayers.
But by the third and fourth counts of the declaration, and the
appellant's third and fourth prayers, it is sought to give another
character to the transaction and to place the right to recover upon
a different ground.
They present the case in this view, viz. : That there was no sale
and purchase of the bonds, but by the false representations of the
teller, the appellant was induced to receive them, instead of money,
in payment of the draft on New York, which she presented at the
bank to be cashed or collected. It is argued that, in this aspect,
the transaction amounts to the same thing as if the teller bad
cashed the draft by paying her over the counter in depreciated or
worthless bank-notes, representing them to be good. But the
answer to this position is that there is no evidence in the record to
support it. The proof shows that on the 6th of October 1871, the
appellant presented at the bank a draft on New York for $1047,
and asked the teller if it was good, and if he would cash it. The
teller gave her $47 in money and a certificate of deposit for the
balance to the effect that she has "deposited in this bank $1000
payable to the order of herself on return of this certificate properly endorsed." This instrument is in the usual form of a certificate of deposit, bears date the 6th of October 1871, and is signed
by the teller for the cashier. There is a discrepancy in the testimony as to whether anything was said at that time about investing
her money in Northern Pacific Bonds. According to her testimony,
as stated in the record, it may be inferred the alleged false representations were then made, but whether before or after she received
the certificate of deposit does not clearly appear; and, according
to the testimony on the other side, nothing was said about these
bonds until some ten or twelve days thereafter, when she returned
and insisted upon investing her money.' But it is immaterial when
this occurred, because it is an undisputed fact that she received
and accepted the certificate on that (lay, long before the bonds
were delivered to her. The draft to the extent of $1000 -was
received by the bank as money, and as such it passed to her credit,
and she became the creditor of the bank for that amount as an
ordinary depositor. Whatever may have been said at or before
this time, it is clear beyond dispute that by this transaction the
draft was, as between herself and the bank, cashed or converted
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into money, which became hers in the coffers of the bank to use
and dispose of as she saw fit. It is further shown by undisputed
testimony that these bonds were ordered by the cashier from
the Baltimore brokers, and received on the 19th of October
1871, a few days after the order for them was sent; that they
remained in the bank until some time in April following, when
the appellant, either in person or through an agent, returned the
certificate of deposit and got the bonds, paying the interest accrued
at the time of the purchase out of the January.coupons on the
bonds which the teller then cashed for her; that she thereafter
retained the bonds, collecting the interest upon them up to July
1st 1873, and that they were sold in the market at par and accrued
interest up to the financial crisis in the fall of 1873. From these
facts the law can regard the transaction in no other light than as
a pu'chavse of these bonds by the appellant through the teller or
cashier, she paying therefor her own money deposited to her credit
in the bank. It was entirely competent for the bank to receive
the draft for collection, or to accept and receive it as a deposit of
so much money; and there is no evidence in the case legally suf.
ficient to authorize a jury to infer that the teller (acting as he
would be in that respect in the discharge of his duty and within
the scope of his employment) cashed the draft bypassing off upon
her these bonds instead of money in payment therefor. For these
reasons there is no error in the rejection of the last two prayers
of the appellant, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Having disposed of the case in this way, it becomes unnecessary
to express any opinion upon the question argued at bar whether
an action like this will lie against a corporation in its corporate
character for deceit practised by its officers or agents.
Judgment affirmed.
So far as we can learn, after very
thorough search through the digests
and periodicals, the foregoing is the
first case in which the power of National Banking Associations, as to the
scope of the business of banking, is
defined. It follows too, as a fit supplement to the very well adjudged cases,
cited in argument, and referred to by

the court: Fowler v. Scnl, W'ilei/ v.
The First tionad Bank rf Brattleoro,
and The Fbrst -Vational Bank of Ly1on
r. The Ocean National Bank.

The seeming hardship growing out
of the denial of a remedy, in a case
falling so apparently within the ordinary purview of banking. is fully and
fairly met in the view presented in the
Vermont case, ante, p. 342, that the
plaintiff dealt with the officers of the
bank, not from compulsion, but as a
matter of choice, and if the officer
"assumed to have any power he did
not possess, the plaintiff trusted him in
that respect and has his responsibility to
rely upon to vindicate the assumption."
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to be no cases growing out of contract,
where opportunity for the rescission of
the contract has passed, which cannot
be reached by the action for money had
and received ; and as in no cases, except
Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518, and
White v. Sawyer, 16 Gray 586, has the
measure of damages been carried beyond the extent of the benefit accruing
from the fraud, there is now no practical reasqn for a distinct form of action.
Recurring to the principle announced
by Judge MILLER, it presents itself as
fairly meeting %vlfat, but for the independent course of the courts, would
soon give rise to innumerable evils.
The drift of the age is to the development of corporate enterprise : and with
the facility with which corporations are
created tinder general statutes, the frequently poorly defined scope of power,
and the tendency to make each the
source of gain in every possible direction, it is only by careful judicial limitation of their powers that, on the one
hand, they may be restrained within
proper bounds, and prohibited from enCRANWORTIt in Ranger v. The Great croachments upon the well-known comUestern Railway Co., 5 H. L. Cases 72 ; mon-law rights, and on the other that
Vew Brunswick Railway Co. v. Cony- the public may be protected with them.
brare, 9 Id. 711 ; Western Bank of
No better instance can be given than
Scotland v. Addie, supra. " An atten- this case. Banking is not in its nature
tive consideration of the cases has con- a corporate franchise; consequently
vinced me that the true principle is, every step outside their charter powers
that these corporate bodies, through is an infringement of public right.
whose agents so large a portion of the
The cases cited in the opinion, with
business of the country is now carried those of the brief, go very far toward
on, may be made responsible for the the full judicial interpretation of the
frauds of those agents to the extent to powers of National Banking Associawhich the companies have profited from tions, and the establishment of thosethese frauds; but they cannot be sued limitations of power which serve as
as wrongdoers by imputing to them the safeguards as well to the public, as
misconduct of those whom they have their own sharchollers.
employed. A person defrauded by diThe cases referred to by Judge REDrectors, if the subsequent acts and deal- FIELD in his note, ante, p. 348, with the
ings of the parties have been such as to cases cited here, include nearly all-all
leave him no remedy but an action for the more important ones-arising upon
the fraud, must seek his remedy against the construction of this act.
the directors personally." There seem
Indeed, this phase of the case serves
to illustrate the wisdom of the decision
of the House of Lords in the case TVestern Bank of Scotland v. Addle, L. R.
I H. L. Sc. 145.
The gradual tendency of the decisions
of the House of Lords, and on Chancery Appeals, in England, and to some
extent of the courts of the several
staics, is to place tile
action for deceit
upon more substantial and clearly defined grounds, the principle of the recovery, and the measure of it as well,
being the benefit accruing to the party
by whom, or in whose behalf, the false
representations arc made. The proper
action then will be for money had and
received. There would be no substantial ground for discrimination in favor
of a corporate principal in such actions,
were it possible to prove the scienter
against the real principals, the shareholders or members of the corporation.
But this difficulty, except in few and remote cases, is insuperable.
The true principle, however, is unquestionably that announced by Lord
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Sulreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
CHARLES C. WHITTIER v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
A citizen of New Hampshire brought an action in the Supreme Court of that
state against a corporation created by the legislature of the state of Connecticut,
and having its principal place of business in the latter state. A trial was had
before a jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff. :Exceptions taken to certain
rulings of the court by the defendants were transferred to the full bench, and overruled, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on the verdict. The defendants then sued out a writ of review, and at the September Term 1874, filed a
petition for the removal of said action to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the district of New Hampshire. Held, that under the 3d clause of sect. 639 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, providing for the removal of a cause
'from a state court to the Circuit Court of the United States upon petition filed
"at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause," such a petition cannot be filed after one trial has been had by the parties, although the action is one
where review will lie.

ACTION of review of an action of assampsit, brought by Whittier (defendant in review) against the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company (plaintiffs in review), upon a policy of insurance.
The original action was tried by the jury, and on the trial exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court, and the case was
reserved. These exceptions were overruled, and at the March
Term 1874, of the Supreme Judicial Court for said county, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The defendants then sued
out their writ of review, which is dated May 2d 1874, and was
entered at the September Term 1874, of this court: On the first
day of March 1875, the plaintiffs in review filed their petition for
a removal of said action to the next term of the United States
Circuit Court under the Act of Congress passed, in 1866, as
amended by the Act of 1867. In their petition they alleged that
"they are plaintiffs in review; that they are a corporation duly
established by the laws of the state of Connecticut, and a citizen
of said state ; that the said Whittier, the defendant in review, is
a citizen of the state of New Hampshire, and that said parties to
said writ are so described in said writ of review, and that the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars,
exclusive of costs." This petition was signed by the plaintiffs in
review by their secretary. There was also filed the affidavit of the
secretary verifying the facts stated in the petition, and also stating
that "he has reason to believe and does believe that from prejudice and local influence the said defendant company will not be
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able to obtain justice in the Circuit Court for the state of New
Hampshire." They also filed a sufficient bond, as required by
said Act of Congress.
The court pro forma denied the prayer of the petition, to which
the plaintiffs in review excepted.
The questions arising upon the foregoing case were transferred
to this court for determination.
il ugridge (with whom were Pike &' Blodgett), for the plaintiffs
in review.
WTPipple (with whom was Barnard), for the .defendant in
review.
SMnTII, J.-The enactment of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, which were approved June 22d 1874, operated to
repeal the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Acts of 1866 and 1867
regulating the removal of actions from a state to a Federal court.
Under the Act of 1866 an action within its provisions might be
removed into the Circuit Court of the United States upon petition
filed " at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause."
Under the Act of 1867, an action witbin its provisions might be
removed into the Circuit Court of the United States upon petition
filed "at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit."
The difference between these two acts in this respect is marked
and distinct.
We have been referred by the plaintiffs in review to the case of
Insurance Co. v. -Dunn,19 Wall. 214, which their counsel claims
is an authority directly in point in favor of granting this petition.
That would be so, provided there has been no change in the statute in the particular above noticed. It becomes important then
to inquire whether Congress, in enacting the Revised Statutes
has made any change in this respect.
Section 639 contains the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1789, and of the Acts of 1866 and 1867, relating to the removal
of actions from the state to the Federal courts. In examining to
ascertain whether the Act of 1867 has been changed in the particular above mentioned, we look to the corresponding portion of
said section, which is the third clause, from which it appears that
Congress in revising the laws has made its legislation uniform in
this respect. It provides that a petition for removal may be filed
" at any time before the.trial or final hearing of the suit," adopt-
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ing the same language that was used in the Act of 1866, and to
which it still adhered in re-enacting that act in the second clause
of said section.
It is aliparent to my mind that this change was not the result
of accident, bat was deliberately made to secure uniformity upon
the subject, in view of the conflicting decisions between the Federal and state courts upon this question: Akerly v. TVilas, 8 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 229 and 558; Johnson v. Monell, Woolworth
390; Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; Brantv. Bich, 106
lass. 192.
In Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall., Judge SwAyNE says, p.
226: "In the Act of Congress of 1866, the language used in
this connection is ' at any time before the trial or final hearing.'
If the difference in the Act of 1867 be material, it is fair to presume that the change was deliberately made to obviate doubts that
might possibly have arisen under the former act, and to make the
latter more comprehensive." That that court considered that
there was a substantial difference in the language of the Acts of
1866 and 1867 further appears from the second head-note to the
case, which reads thus: "The language above quoted-' at any
time before the final hearing or trial of the suit '-of the "Act
of March 2d 1867, is not of the same import as the language of
the Act of July 27th 1866, on the same general subject-' at any
time before the trial or final hearing.' On the contrary, the word
' final,' in the first-mentioned act, must be taken to apply to the
word ' trial' as well as to the word 'hearing.' Accordingly, although a removal was made after a trial on the merits, a verdict, a
motion for a new trial made and refused, and a judgment on the
verdict, yet it having been so made in a state where by statute
the party could still demand, as of right, a second trial-held, that
such first trial was not a 'final trial' within the meaning of the
Act of Congress, the party seeking to remove the case having demanded and having got leave to have a second trial under the
said statute of the state."
In Bryant v. Bich, 8upra, GRAY, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court, said-" The words ' before final hearing' in the Act
of Congress of 1867 would seem to be equivalent in meaning to
the same words-' trial or final hearing '-as transposed in the
similar Act of 1866, ch. 228; and it is at least doubtful whether
a party who has once taken the chance of a decision upon the
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merits by a trial before the jury in an action at law, or a hearing
before the court in a suit in equity, in the state court, can, if the
case stands open for a new trial or further hearing, remove it into
another tribunal. It has been decided by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in a very able judgment, that he could not: Akerly
v. Vitas, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 558."
The requirement of the present statute then is, that the petition
must be filed before " the trial or final hearing in the suit," and
not as formerly, "before the final hearing or trial of the suit."
That this does not mean " final trial" is, I think, clear from the
change that was made in the revision of the laws, and seems to be
authorized by the stress which is put upon the difference in the
language of the Acts of 1866 and 1867.by the Supreme Court in
Insurance Co. v. Dunn, supra.
The parties in this case have had a trial by jury. The original
plaintiff recovered a verdict; the exceptions of the defendant were
overruled by the full bench, and judgment for the plaintiff was.
entered upon the verdict. This judgment cannot be reversed or
otherwise affected by a judgment in review. The petitioner's
counsel very truly says in his brief-" it remains, whatever the result
of the review, and the party in whose favor it was rendered retains whatever he obtained by it: unless reversed by error it must
ever stand as the final determination and conclusion of the suit
which preceded it: Badger v. Gilmore, 37 N. H. 459; Andrews
v. Foster, 42 Id. 379; Pike v. Pike, 24 Id. 397. Such a
trial answers fully the meaning of" the term, as used in sect. 639
of the Revised Statutes. In limiting the time when a petition for
removal must be filed to a period prior to such trial, Congress
must be deemed to have intended that the party who may prevail
upon such trial in the state court should not be deprived of the
fruits of the trial and of the judgment rendered therein at the
pleasure of the discontented party.
It is questionable whether the Constitution could have been
adopted if it had been understood that it conferred on Congress
the power to pass an act removing an action from a state to a
Federal court. In Ifetherbee v. Johnson, 14 Mass. 412, it is said
that it has been held in the Supreme Court of Virginia "that it
never was the intention of the Constitution of the United States
to consider the Supreme Courts of the several states as tribunals
inferior to the courts of the United States, or that a privilege was
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given to a defendant who had submitted to the jurisdiction of a
state court, taken his trial there, and finally failed in his defence,
to harass his adversary by intercepting the remedy which he may
have obtained at great expense, and carrying his cause to a tribunal whose sessions would be at the seat of the National Government, perhaps a thousand miles distant from the place of his residence."
The decision is, perhaps, only valuable as showing the understanding of those who lived in the time of the early history of the
republic.
There are very many strong reasons why, after the parties have
submitted to one trial in a state court, the cause should not be removed to another jurisdiction. "If it is not a " dangerous interference with the independence of the state tribunals," it tends " to
vex and harass the citizen by a multitude of trials-the last of
which would be remote from his place of residence, where it would
be always difficult and sometimes impossible for him to prove the
facts upon which his cause 'depended; besides which it infringes
one of the most ancient and cherished principles of the common
law, that the trial of facts should be in the vicinage where they
happened:" Wetherbee v. Johnson, supfa, 420.
The result of my conclusions is, that the statutes of the United
States do not authorize the removal of this cause to the Circuit
Court of the United States for this district. The netition therefore should be denied.
think this petition should be denied. There has
LADD, J.-I
been a trial of the cause upon its merits in the state court, and a
final and irreversible judgment rendered therein. Availing themselves of a right conferred by a statute of this state, the defendants have brought a review; and the cause may now be tried over
again here, in accordance with the provisions of the statute, which
imposes various qualifications and conditions upon the exercise of
the right : Gen. Stats., ch. 215, §§ 10, 11, 12, 13. Unless the
cause is to be tried and judgment to be rendered in the Federal
court on review, the same as though it had not been tried before
at all (which I suppose nobody will pretend), I do not see how it
can be tried there at all, unless the Federal court will undertake
to administer the municipal law of New Hampshire, and communicate with the state court for the purpose of ascertaining what
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the final judgment there shall be. But even if this difficulty were
out of the way, it seems to me the reasons against the construction
of the United States statute contended for by the plaintiff in
review are quite strong and controlling. Undoubtedly the language of a legislative act ought to be very clear and unequivocal,
before a court would be warranted in holding that the legislature
intended to give parties the right to experiment in a state court
by going through with a full trial of the merits there, and then,
if they are not satisfied with the result, carry their cause to another
court for a retrial of the same issues of fact already once settled
by the verdict. of a jury to which they have voluntarily submitted
them. Practically it would amount to an appeal, and make the
state courts inferior to any Federal court now in existence, or
which may be hereafter created, to which it shall be provided that
such cause may be remoyed. The right to a retrial in the state
court is given by a statute of the state, but that statute confers no
jurisdiction upon any other tribunal. I fully agree with my
brother SMITH, that the language of this act admits of no such
construction.
Further: if such a construction were to be put upon the act, I
should say that, in its spirit and practical operation it is in direct
conflict with the seventh article of amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, which declares that "no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States
than according to the rules of the common law" : Wetherbee v.
Johnson, 14 Mass. 412; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180, and
cases cited on page 193. By the rules of the common law, facts
once settled by the verdict of a jury cannot be tried again by
another jury in the same proceeding.
The merits of this question have been recently considered by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of Galpin, v. Critclow, 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S.137, where, after a careful
examination of the various Acts of Congress relating to the subject, it was decided that an action cannot be removed from a state
court into the Circuit Court of the United States under the Act of
Congress of 1867, ch. 196, after a trial on the merits, although
such trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury. With entire
respect it may be said that, so far as regards the reasons upon
which the question should be determined, no higher authority
can be produced, and I fully agree with the reasoning of the
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learned Chief Justice in that case, and with the conclusion reached
by the court. The question, however, whether the language of the
Act of 1867 is equivalent to that used in the Act of 1866, need
not be discussed, because of the change of phraseology made by
the Revised Statutes.
Nor is it necessary to inquire how far the case of Insurance
Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, could be regarded as an authority in
favor of the plaintiff's contention had no such change in phraseology been made.
In view of the provisions of our statute with respect to reviews,
and the amendment of the United States Constitution referred to,
as now advised, I should hesitate before ordering a-cause removed
to the Circuit Court of the United States for review, in pursuance
of any statute that might be passed by Congress, until such right
of removal had been determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon error to the judgment of this court.
CUSHING, C. J., concurred.

Exceptions overruled and petition denied.

United States -DistrictGourt,.
IIARMANSON,

-Eastern-Districtof 'Virginia.

AssICNEE, ETC., v.

WILSON.

'here interest is not expressly stipulated for in the contract, it is not an essential part thereof, and the state may prohibit its recovery without impairing the
obligation of the contract.
In Virginia interest is only recoverable by virtue of statutes which make the
allowance of it discretionary with the court and jury. Therefore a statute allowing an abatement of interest that accrued during the war, between citizens of the
same state, is constitLtonal and valid.
Senible, the act would be valid in Virginia even in cases where interest was expressly contracted for.

Tnis was a bill to subject certain real estate of the defendant,
Wilson, to the payment of two notes, held against him by the
assignee in bankruptcy of the Portsmouth Savings Fund Society,
secured by deed of trust.
One of the notes was for $3450, dated February 4th 1862,
which was given in renewal of other notes, which commenced
before April 1861. The other note, given in like manner for
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notes beginning before April 1861, was for $2990, and was dated
on the 29th November 1870.
The defence was only to the claim for interest during the period
of the late war.
James -E. Heath, for plaintiff.-I. The defence relies on the
Act of Virginia of 1872-3, ch. 353, p. 344; V. C. 1873, cl. 173,
p. 1120, sect. 14. Interest is implied from the nature of the contract, which is commercial paper, and is as much part of the contract as if expressed on its face: Page v. Arewman, 9 Barn. &
Cres. 378; Poster v. Weston, 6 Bing. 799 ; Colton v. Bragg, 15
East 223; 1 H. & M1. 211; Wood v. Hickock, 2 Wend. 501;
.obinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1086 ; 3 Cow. 436.
Therefore the Act is unconstitutional as to this claim : Planters'
Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
213; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat 1; i'_feOCracken v. Hayward, 2
How. 608; Sturgqs v. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat. 122; .Yletcher
v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 ; ron Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall.
553; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt.
244; Bank of the Old Dominion v. Mc Veigh, 20 Gratt. 457;
Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 266.
2. The allowance of interest is matter of contract either express
or implied. The statutes referred to as allowing interest from
37th Henry VIII. down are merely negative; they do not declare
in what cases interest shall be taken. The law of Virginia is
not different from that of England and other states in this respect.
Wilson and Baker & Walke, for defendant.
HUGHES, J.-I think that upon authority, as presented in the
Virginia cases of McCall v. Turner, 1 Call 115; Brewer v.
Hastie, 3 Call 21; Ambler's -Executors v. .'f-acon et al., 4 Call
605; Tucker v. Wat.son, icGill 1 Co., 6 Am. Law Reg. 220;
and the series of Acts of Assembly by which this state has expressly and continuously, from the beginning, preserved to her
juries a discretionary power over the subject of interest on money,
we may assume the law of this Commonwealth, as between citizens
thereof, to be, that interest during a period of war may be disallowed by a jury or a court without breach of contract. The legislature of Virginia, by a long series of acts, reaching down, in
conjunction with Acts of Parliament, from the time when, by
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express statute, the taking of interest on money at such rate as the
statute expressly named was declared not to be usury, -and was
converted from a crime into a statutory privilege, has reserved to
itself the power to say first, through a jury, under what circumstances interest may be taken at all; and next, what percentage
of interest shall be allowed. The statutes, and the decisions of her
highest courts and ablest judges in the cases I have named, seem
to me to settle the law of the subject for this Commonwealth. The
law may not be precisely the same in other states 6f the Union, or
in England. The weight of authority elsewhere is probably in
favor of the exaction of war interest; and the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in cases between other litigants than citizens of Virginia probably incline in the same direction ; but a Federal court adjudicating between citizens of a state
of the Union in cases where the lex loci contractusgoverns, is bound
to follow the law of that state as interpreted by its courts of highest resort; and therefore I feel bound in this case to disregard
contrary decisions on this subject which may have been made by
the courts of other states, or by the Federal courts in adjudicating
between citizens of other states, and uphold the Virginia statute,
sect. 14, chapter 173, of the Code of 1873. If I were to deny the
power of the court or of a jury to disallow war interest in Virginia,
I should have not only to nullify an Act of Assembly which all
courts of the state are now administering, but to disregard solemn
decisions of its Supreme Court of Appeals, never overruled, and
rendered at a time when that court commanded, probably more
than at any other, the highest consideration among lawyers and
jurists. The only ground upon which opposition is or can be made
to this provision of the Code, leaving it in the discretion of court
and jury to allow or not allow interest during the period of the late
war, is, that it impairs the obligation of contracts, and thus violates
that clause of the national Constitution which prohibits the states
from passing laws having such effect.
It is contended, however, in reply, that interest is not in all
cases an obligation of contract, in the meaning of the clause of the
national Constitution referred to. It is true that it is sometimes
expressly provided for in the bond, promissory note, or other writing inwhich parties unite. In such cases, of course, the payment
of it is an obligation of contract; and but for the fact'that the
taking of interest at all is wholly of legislative permission, and
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that that provision has been in Yirginia continually coupled with
a legislative reservation to juries of discretion over it, there could
be no denial of the fact that the obligation was protected by the
provision of the national Constitution which has been named.
But in the large majority of cases interest is not payable by
express contract. In a multitude of them the obligation to pay it
is only implied. Where it is not given by express contract, and
the obligation to pay it is not implied by the courts, there is a
large class of cases in which it is given as damages for the non-payment of money when due. There are, therefore (using the terms
of the civil law), three modes in which interest may become due;
by obligation ex contractu, by obligation quasi ex contractu, and
by obligation ex delicto ; that is to say, by contract, by implied
contract, and by tort. It is with reason contended that the prohibition of the National Constitution does not apply to the two
latter classes of contract, but only to the first. There is reason
for prohibiting the states from impairing express contracts entered
into in solemn form ; while great mischief and abuse may result
from wholly annihilating their power over the multitudinous class
of implied contracts, which are inferences of the courts, often controvening the intention of parties. The clause of that instrument
containing the prohibition is in these words: "No state shall
* * * * pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-

pairing the obligation of contracts." Each of the other phrases
in the context is used in its strictly technical sense. " Bill of attainder" has a well-defined judicial meaning, and the courts will
not give it a constructive meaning other than or beyond its technical one. So the phrase ex post facto law is held to embrace only
laws relating to crimes, and will not be allowed by the courts to
embrace retrospective laws affecting civil rights. Likewise, it is
contended that the phrase obligation of contracts should be strictly
construed; that is to say, should be treated technically ; and
should not be interpreted to embrace other contracts than those
known in the classification of the civil law as obligations ex contractu, or express contracts. It is a historical fact that the prohibition was inserted in the Constitution on the motion of an eminent civil lawyer, educated in Scotland, Mr. WILSoN, afterwards
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. There can be
no doubt that the mover of the provision intended it to have only its
technical signification; and it is with reason contended that the
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phrase should be construed strictly, and not be latitudinously extended to apply to obligations quasi ex contractit (implied contracts), or to obligations ex delicto, the obligation to pay damages.
What posgible reason can exist for depriving the states of power
over the latter classes of obligations ?
Neither of the notes which are the subject of tne petition in this
case gives interest in terms. It is due upon each of them only by
implication. It is due for the forbearance of money. It is due
by obligation quasi ex contractu. It may with -reason be contended, therefore, that this is not one of the class of contracts filling within that prohibition of the National Constitution which
would render the Act of the Virginia Assembly voil in regard to
express contracts.
But however this phrase of the National Constitution may be
interpreted touching the special subject of interest in other states,
and in suits between citizens of other states, the question in Virginia stands upon a special basis, to some extent peculiar to this
Commonwealth. Here the state of the law relating to interest is
as follows: By common law, the taking of interest was usury, and
a punishable offence. This being the normal condition of the law
for a long time, a statute finally was passed in England giving the
creditor permission to charge a certain limited percentage of interest ; the taking of a greater percentage being still left as a
punishable offence; and in Virginia this statutory permission has
been continued from time to time down to the present day, always
coupled with a legislative provision that the allowance of even the
rate of interest permitted to be taken by law should be within the
discretion of juries.
Therefore this legislative provision has entered into and become
a part of every contract of interest, express or implied, which has
been made during its existence upon the statute book. Being a
part of the contract in every case, the clause of the National Constitution prohibiting the passage of laws impairing the obligation
of contracts, does not apply to this law of Virginia.
The condition of the law in Virginia, on this subject, is precisely the same as it is on the subject of corporate charters. When
the legislature grants a charter, but for a general law on the subject it would have no power to alter or amend the charter until
the term for which it had been granted had expired. This is so,
because of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dartmouth
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College Case, which declared charters to be contracts ; and that
laws altering charters had the effect of impairing the obligation of
contracts, and therefore contravened the clause of the National
Constitution forbidding such laws.
The consequence has been, that most or all of the states-Virginia among them-have expressly reserved the right to alter or
pmend every charter that is granted. In Virginia this reservation
is not repeated in each act of charter, but is a standing provision
in the form of a general law of corporations ; so that now, by
virtue of that general law, the legislature of the state alters and
amends every charter at its pleasure ; and these amendatory laws
do not contravene the clause of the National Constitution under
consideration.
Precisely the same is the case with reference to the disallowance
of interest. From a period long anterior to the adoption of the
National Constitution, has the General Assembly of this state
reserved to itself the power of intrusting the allowance of interest
to the discretion of juries. This express reservation of power has
entered into every contract between her citizens that has been
made within a hundred years, and the Act of Assembly of 1872-3,
ch. 353, p. 344, Code of 1873, sect. 14, ch. 173, p. 1120, directing the courts and juries to exercise that discretion, does not, in
my opinion, in any degree, impair the obligation of contracts within
the inhibition of the National Constitution.
As to the equities of the case alluded to by both counsel in the
conclusion of their briefs, I think there are, in general, very strong
equities against the allowance of war interest. In the great majority of cases in which the interest for that period is unpaid, the
creditors refused to accept it, at the time it fell due, in the currency then in circulation. They preferred to take the chances of
receiving gold, or its equivalent, after the war should be over, and
of the enactment of such legislation as the state has actually resorted to. The permanent and fixed legislative policy of the state
had been and was to reserve to her juries the discretion of allowing
or disallowing all interest; and these creditors certainly ought to
have contemplated the vety probable contingency of the legislature's directing the exercise of this discretion as to interest falling
due during the war, when all the resources of the state and
her citizens were devoted to the prosecution of their side of the
contest. They had knowledge of the legislative policy alluded to,
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and had notice of the probability that war interest would be disallowed as described. If. with such notice, they chose to refuse
interest, as it became due, or to forbear the collection of it, they
cannot now complain of the harshness of the law by which it is
disallowed.
The assignee in bankruptcy has made his claim to war interest
in this case by bill in chancery, making the maker of the notes,
the trustee in the deeds of trust securing their payment, and the
endorsers of the notes on which the interest is claiined, parties defendant. A decree will be given in accordance with the prayer
of the bill, except that the defendant, Wilson, will be required to
pay the amount which shall be found due upon the fiotes, without
computing interest for the period between the 17th April 1861, and
the 10th April 1865.

Squ~reme Court of Mi~ichigan.
COOK

ET AL.

V. ROGERS, GARNISHEE

OF

BOW.

* An assignment by a debtor of all his property in trust for the payment of his
debts, is an exercise of ownership by virtue of the common law and is valid, irrespective of any insolvent laws.
Hence the fact that the passage of a National Bankrupt Act has ip.o facto suspended the insolvent laws of the state, does not make such an assignment void, so
that a creditor can by a proceeding in the state court attach the property in the
hands of the assignee.
Whether such an assignment is an act of bankruptcy which will give the Federal courts jurisdiction to set it aside and assume the administration of the estato
under the Bankrupt Law, is a different question, which can only be raised in the
Bankruptcy Court. Until action by the latter,the state court will sustain the
validity of the assignment.

ON writ of error. On November 18th 1873, Albert Bow made a
voluntary assignment of his property to Eli B. Rogers, for the
equal benefit of all his creditors, no preferences being declared.
Rogers accepted the trust and took possession.
A few days later, the plaintiffs commenced a suit against Bow
in the Circuit Court, to recover a debt of some three hundred dollars they held against him.
On the institution of this suit they at once proceeded by
garnishee process in the same court against Rogers. And being
summoned to appear and make disclosure on such process, he appeared on the 16th of December 1873 and made a general denial.
The plaintiff then filed a series of special interrogatories to be
VOL. XXIII-0
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answered by him, and on the 27th of the same month he appeared
and answered categorically.
From these answers it appeared that Bow had assigned to him
as before stated, that the personal property assigned was estimated
as worth several thousand dollars and the real estate from twelve
to fourteen hundred.
It also appeared that Rogers had no interest other than that of
trustee, and that he was in possession of the assigned property when
the summons was served upon him.
On the 27th of July 1874, judgment was given in the principal
suit against Bow for damages $281.31, and thereupon on the same
day the garnishee suit against Rogers, Bow's assignee, was brought
on to be tried before the court without a jury, and it was expressly
admitted that when Bow assigned he was indebted for more than
$1000 upon claims already due, and that Rogers received into his
possession from Bow under the assignment, and still retained,
property exceeding in value the amount of the plaintiffs' judgment
against Bow.
The counsel for plaintiffs then prayed a finding by the court,
and they likewise presented two propositions of law in the nature
of requests to charge :
First, that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against Rogers
because the assignment was not in compliance with Oh. 234, C. L.,
entitled " Of the power, duties and obligations of assignees of
insolvent debtors under this title." Second, that the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover, because the assignment was void as contrary
to and not in conformity with and made under the Bankrupt Law of
the United States.
The court then macte a finding of facts upon the disclosure
and admissions, and decided as matter of law that the assignment
was valid and passed the title of the property to Rogers in trust
for Bow's creditors, and that the possession by Rogers of the
property in virtue of the assignment gave no right to plaintiffs as
creditors of Bow to maintain garnishee process against Rogers;
and that Rogers was entitled to judgment for his costs and expenses,
which were fixed at $20.
The plaintiffs excepted to the finding, and caused the case to be
brought here on writ of error.
L. N. Keating and J. S. Galloway, for plaintiffs in error.1. If the assignment is void as to any creditor, garnishment will
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lie in his behalf: lZeep v. Sanderson, 2 Wis. 61; 12 Id. 353.
So where the assignment is not in conformity with the state law:
G isse v. Beale, 2 Wis. 367 ; Page v. Smith, 24 Id. 368; Norton v. Reed, 6 Id. 525; Mann v. Huston, 1 Gray 250; Barton v.
Tower, 5 Law Reporter 215; Chap. 234, Compiled Laws of 1871;
Stout v. IKeys, 2 Doug. 184 ; Edwards v. 3litchel, 1 Gray 239.
2. The assignment not being under the provisions of the Bankrupt
Law and in conformity therewith, garnishment will lie upon the
part of the plaintiffs: Cooley's Limitations 273, :d note; Bump
on Bankruptcy 259 and 260; Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheaton
213; Strong v. Orownshield,4 Id. 196; -Hoyle v. Zacharie, 6
Pet. 639 ; Adams v. S'tory, 1 Paine C. C. 210. 'The Bankrupt
Act ipso facto suspends the state insolvent laws: Jfatter of
Reynold, 8 R. I. 485 ; Comm. v. O'Hara,6 Am. Law Reg. N.
S. 765; 31artin v. Berry, 37 Cal. 208; Griswold v. Pratt, 9
Mete. 16 ; Day v. Bardwell, 97 Mass. 247 ; Chamberlain v. Perkins, 51 N. H. 336. A common-law assignment cannot have any
greater effect than an assignment under the state insolvent laws,
both are superseded by the passage of the National Bankrupt Act.
-E. L. and Mt. B. Koon, for defendant.-1. A common-law
assignment is valid irrespective of insolvent laws: Beck v. Parker, 65 Penn. St. 262; Reed v. Taylor, 32 Iowa 209; ilfaltbie
v. Hotchkiss, 38 Conn. 80; Be Hawkins, 2 Bank. Reg. 122;
Perry v. Langley, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 429; Bump on Bankruptcy 259, 514.
2. The authorities cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, refer to
assignments made under state insolvent laws-having the same
object in view as the Bankrupt Law, to wit: The distribution of the
debtor's assets, and his discharge from his debts, and can have no
bearing upon the present case. And the authorities are conflicting
as to whether the Bankrupt Law operated to wholly suspend or
supersede all state insolvent laws, or had that effect only when proceedings under the Bankrupt Law were taken : 32 Iowa. 209 ; 1
Bank. Reg. 204; Id. 36; 7 Am. Law Reg. 100, 105 ; 9 Id. 304;
37 Cal.'208; 3 McLean 494.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAVES, J.-Baw's assignment was a common law conveyance
for the benefit of his creditors at large. It contained no preferences whatever, but provided for an equal distribution among
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all his creditors. There is no pretence that Rogers was not a suit
able person to be assignee, and no hint is made against his responsibility. No fraud is found or imputed. The surrender of his
property by Bow for the equal benefit of all his creditors by the
voluntary assignment in no way exonerates him personally, or discharges his obligations, or can shield his future gains.
The first proposition of law submitted to the court is most properly abandoned. It was without a shadow of force. The second
is, however, insisted on, and it is the only point attempted to be
maintained, and an elaborate argument has been submitted in its
favor.
Were it not for the apparent confidence of counsel that it possesses merit, we should dismiss it without a moment's hesitation and
affirm the judgment.
Upon the case as it stands before us, it must be taken as true
that the assignment was an honest conveyance to a proper person,
and honestly and fiirly intended to secure the full payment of all
the creditors at the same time and within a reasonable period, if
the property should be found sufficient, and if not, then to be distributed equally and rateably within a reasonable time among all
the creditors.
Nevertheless the plaintiffs prosecute this garnishee process under
the state law against the assets so assigned and dedicated to all
alike, and under such process insist upon their right in the name
of the Bankrupt Law and as a consequence of its existence to compel payment out of the assigned effects of their claim in full and
without delay, whatever may be the consequence to other creditors
having equal equities, and without heed to the fact of sufficiency
or insufficiency of the fund to satisfy the just demands of other
creditors.
The proposition comes to this. Equal distribution of the property of the debtor pro rata is the main purpose which the Bankrupt Act seeks to accomplish, as we are. told by the Supreme
Court of the United States; Buchanan v. Smith, 16 Wall. 277 ;
and yet a common-law assignment made to a proper person and in
perfect good faith and squaring exactly with the " main purpose"
of the Bankrupt Act, is not only to be disregarded as void in a
garnishee proceeding against the assignee in the state court, in the
name and as a consequence of the existence of this act, but at the
particular instance of parties, who by the very proceeding itself
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in which and under which the claim is set up, are solely aiming to
disappoint and defeat such " main purpose," and secure to themselves present full satisfaction, without the slightest regard to the
equal claims of other creditors.
Before yielding to a proposition so extravagant we should certainly require very convincing proof of its-solidity and force.
The argument in its favor is in substance this. It is settled by
authority from which there is no appeal, that the existence of a
Federal bankrupt law ipsofacto suspends all state insolvent laws;
that the common law prevailing in this state on which voluntary
assignments for the benefit of creditors are based, and to which they
owe all their legal efficacy, is a part of the state system regulating
and governing in cases of insolvency, and within the principle
which causes a bankrupt act to work suspension of incompatible
regulations, and hence no voluntary assignment for the benefit of
creditors, however right, regular and proper in all respects in the
abstract, can have any force or validity whatever if made whilst a
bankrupt law is in existence.
Without stopping to consider whether a garnishee proceeding
before a justice or in the Circuit Court is a proper one for raising
the question, and without pausing to notice several difficulties in
the plaintiffs' case, it suffices to observe that the second term involved in their proposition, and which they cannot dispense with, is
fatally infirm.
There is no proper analogy between insolvent laws correctly so
called and those principles of the common law here which allow
and sanction the conveyance of his property by a debtor for the
equal benefit of all his creditors, and no such resemblance or relation as to warrant the conclusion that if the existence of a bankrupt law suspends the first it must also suspend the last.
Insolvent laws are not principles which are the birthright of
the citizen and pervade the state as naturally as the right to acquire property and dispose of it; but they are artificial yet positive
regulations made by the legislature to exonerate the person or
property of the debtor and to relieve him from the pressure of
creditors. They neither originate in nor rest upon any general
right in the individual to contract ; neither do they at all depend
finally upon any general and independent power of the individual
in virtue of his proprietary right to handle his property in any
honest way his judgment may dictate. On the contrary, they are
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provisionary limitations of this power to contract and dispose of
property, and such as the legislature consider are justified on the
ground of their general utility and advantage. They belong to
the same family, and are often nearly if not altogether identical
with what by way of eminence are called bankrupt laws. They
are induced by the same or resembling motives, and operate in the
same direction. In short, they are so similar in design, complexion
and operation to laws which may be described as bankruptcy laws,
that no court has yet been able to make any distinct dividing
lne.
In consequence of this sameness, the common character of the
objects and the identity of the sphere of operation of these differently named laws, and in consequence of the supremacy due to
laws made by Congress, pursuant to the Federal provision respecting a bankrupt law, and in furtherance of the policy of that provision, and to avoid conflicting proceeding , it has been considered
that the existence of a congressional system ought to supersede or
suspend the diverse systems established in the several states, and
place the subject on common and equal ground throughout the whole
Union. Now the regulations affected by this rule in the different
states are extremely various. In some, the legislature, it is believed, has gone so far as to absorb these common-law assignments
for the benefit of creditors into the local system of insolvency
regulations, or has connected the two by strong positive provisions.
In other states the subject has been left at large, without any
attempt to efface the natural distinction between the disposition
made in virtue of ownership and the power of contracting, and
the disposition commanded by positive law. Where this state of
things exists, a common-law assignment for the benefit of creditors is something by itself and resting on a distinct foundation.
Such is the case here. An assignment of the kind before the
court is not a proceeding or any step in a proceeding under or in
connection with the proper insolvent laws of this state. The right
of the debtor to make an assignment for the equal benefit of all
his creditors, stands here by itself and on its own basis of the
common law. It depends upon principles which would remain
efficient if our insolvent laws were all repealed. And these principles possess a vital energy which precludes their suspension by
the mere existence of a Federal bankrupt law. An act founded
an them may no doubt be decreed in a court of bankruptcy to be
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an act of bankruptcy: but we are not here dealing with anything
of that kind. What is this basis for conveying in trust for creditors to which allusion is made ? It is the right which every man,
having tie general capacity to contract, has to make honest and
unforbidden contracts and the right of disposition which is incident to ownership. "The right to make a general assignment of
all a man's property results from that absolute ownership which
every man claims over that which is his own :" MARSHALL, C. J.,
in Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608, 614. "Every debtor has a
legal right to assign property for the security of debts due by
him, and so far from such an act being reprehended by the law
it is justified and approved :" STORY, J., in Broign v. Minturn,
2 Gall. 557. See also United States v. Bank of United States,
8 Rob. 262, 404; iNichols v. lifunford, 4 T. Ch. 522, 529; Robbins v. -Embry, 1 Sm. & Marsh. 207, 258; Pihstoek v. Lystar,
3 Mau. & Sel. 371 ; Giddings v. Sears, 115 Mass. 505.
It is to be steadily borne in mind that we are not inquiring and
are not called upon to inquire how a Federal court would or might
regard this assignment if it were regularly brought into question
under bankruptcy proceedings against the assignor, and where its
force would be directly examinable on an issue distinctly raised on
the Bankrupt Law.
That is a question, as before stated, with which we have no
concern. It is one which might regularly arise under the Bankrupt Act, and in a proceeding calling its energies into play.
The true question here is not whether the assignment was an
Act of Bankruptcy, but whether the bare circumstance that the
act was standing on the statute book of the Union, deprived the
owner of all power to convey his property to one in trust for the
equal benefit of all his creditors in perfect honesty and good faith,
so that independently of any attempt by any one in any place to
put the Bankrupt Law in motion, his conveyance must be deemed
absolutely void, and not even sufficient to give the holding by the
assignee any coloring of right in contemplation of law.
The grounds of the argument to uphold the affirmative have
been examined and they are not satisfactory.
No adjudged case sustaining any such view has fallen under observation, whilst on the contrary a good many have been noticed
which more or less strongly imply the opposite. Three or four may
be particularly referred to.
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In James v. Wlitboard, 11 C. B. 406, property conveyed by
one subject to the Bankrupt Law in trust for creditors, was taken
on execution against the assignor, and it came up on interpleader
whether the assignment was valid so as to defeat the levy. No
point was made upon the necessary invalidity of the assignment as
a consequence of the existence of the Bankrupt Law. The court
sustained the validity of the assignment.
Coale and another v. Williams, 7 Exch. 205, was a similar case,
and the ruling was the same. The principle contended for in the
case at bar, if sound, was applicable to these English cases.
In Buchanan v. Smith, 16 Wall. 277, a paper manufacturing company in New York made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, and Buchanan & Co. in the face of the assignment proceeded in
the state courts to get judgments against the assignors, and levied
execution and secured the appointment of a receiver. Bankruptcy
proceedings were ingtituted against the company, an assignee was
appointed, and he filed a bill in the Federal court to subject the
estate and remove the obstacles raised by the assignment and the
proceedings on the part of Buchanan & Co. in the state courts.
No one pretended that the assignment was void as a consequence
merely of the existence of the Bankrupt Law. The court disposed
of it by saying that both sides had conceded that was repugnant
to a certain local law of the state.
In McLean v. Melvin et al., 8 McLean 199, a bill was filed by
an assignee in bankruptcy to set aside an assignment claimed to
have been made by the bankrupt in contemplation of bankruptcy.
The theory of the proceeding was the direct enforcement of the
Bankrupt Act against the assignors and his estate, and it was based
on the act itself. It was a specific assertion of the powers of the
act in the appointed jurisdiction against an object of those powers,
and not an attempt through a special proceeding under state law
to set up the existence of the Bankrupt Law as enough to defeat
the assignment. And I understand the court thought the assignment invalid when thus directly and distinctly assailed in bankruptcy, but at the same time conceded it would be valid on the
basis of the state laws and when not tried in bankruptcy. There
are many cases having the same bearing.
Now if the position taken by the plaintiffs in the case at bar is
valid it is remarkable that in the case cited and many similar ones,
neither court nor counsel should have had any suspicion of it. So

